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Introduction 
The Chinese labour market has 
undergone an extensive restructuring in 
the last four-and-a-half decades, 
following the start of the economic 
reforms, and the open door policy for 
foreign investment in 1978, under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping.  The 
nature of employment contracts, labour 
market stratification, and wage levels 
have all been redefined, and 
reformulated by this process, as much 
of the labour force shifted from state-
owned-enterprises into other main 
sectors: domestically-owned-private 
enterprises, collective-owned-enterprises, 
foreign-invested-enterprises, and other 
business entities that also include self-
employed people.  The most significant 
change from the pre-1978 economy to 
the present has been in the allocation of 
people to jobs, which is now largely 
governed by the labour market (Ngok 
2008: 61).  That is, the former system 
of the state-governed labour allocation 
(which included lifetime employment for 
many) gave way to the present system 
of work, based on labour contracts, and 
distributed mostly via labour market 
exchange (Chan and Norlund 1998: 176, 
Ding and Warner 2001: 315).  Once the 
nature of work was redefined in terms of 
labour contract, it got sub-divided into 
different types of contracts, with casual 
labour (also referred to as dispatch or 
sub-contracted labour) forming the 
ground layer.  These above elements are 
some of the main characteristics of the 
contemporary Chinese style of labour 
management.  Each major economy 
which is driven by manufactured exports, 
develops its own characteristic model of 
labour management (see the discussion 
in Pudelko and Harzing 2011), however 
this paper lacks the space to discuss the 
contents of the Chinese management 
model in detail, and instead seeks to 
present the basic outlines.  In China’s 
high economic growth environment, new 
legislative measures have sought to 
modify, and improve the nature, and 
content of labour contracts, and the 
firm-level labour-management relations.  
Migrant labour force [people who move 
to urban areas in search of work, and 
mostly remain domicile at their 
workplaces, in dormitories, and 
worksites,  as per the discussion in Kong 
2010] has also been inherent to the 
restructuring process.  Migrant labourers 
do not enjoy the same level of work 
security as the locals, and the 2008 
global financial crisis caused 20 to 45 
million migrant workers to return to their 
rural homes (Meng 2012: 88).  This 
paper will analyse these issues, and 
define the outlines of the topics of 
labour and labour management in 
contemporary China. 
 
1. Economic Growth  
In the last four-and-a-half decades, 
domestic, and foreign investment have 
fuelled the Chinese economic growth, 
and a surplus labour force, that has been 
created from the former employees of 
state-owned-enterprises and migrant 
labourers, slowed down the wages 
growth, for a long period of time (Qi 
2014: 1).  In the 1980s, the expanding 
economy could easily  
absorb the surplus labour from the 
state-owned-enterprises’ layoffs (Chan 
and Norlung 1998: 177).  Soon, the 
volume of layoffs began to exceed the 
available number of jobs, creating the 
dichotomy of permanent (or semi 
permanent) workers, and the rest (which 
is segmented horizontally and vertically, 
based on gender, age, skill, and 
geographical origin of the labour, i.e. 
local versus migrant labour).  From 1998 
onwards, the shift of labour from state-
owned-enterprises to domestically-
owned-private enterprises intensified 
(Deng et al. 2005: 10).  Tens of millions 
of layoffs were a characteristic of the 
1990s, when the loss making small to 
medium size state-owned-enterprises 
(40% of the total) were shut down to 
shift capital to larger entities, which was 
a process that also accompanied a 
massive expansion of the private sector 
of the Chinese economy (Meng 2012: 
76).  Migrant labour numbers also 
continued to increase.  The size of the 
labour market, the geographical spread 
of industrialisation process have all 
meant that the sub-contract labour has 
become a part of the competitive cost 
of production equation (see the 
discussion in FIDH 2013: 19).  
Continuous economic growth has 
underwritten the overall labour shift.  In 
the Chinese labour market, the state 
sector-driven job creation (in the public 
service, and state-owned-enterprises) 
still remains significant (Yan 2014: 24-
25).  Specifically, in the production 
sector, ‘state firms’ employ 30.10% of 
the total production sector workforce, 
and the figures for the rest are: 
‘collective firms’ (9.42%), ‘domestic 
private firms/self-employment’ 
(48.89%), ‘foreign-owned firms’ 
(7.04%), and ‘other type firms’ (4.55%)  
(Meng 2012: 81).  In 2012, China’s 
working age population decreased for 
the first time in the post-1978 era (Qi 
2014: 8).  The primary labour market 
stratification of standard wage/low 
wage will, reportedly, decline in this 
decade, because the labouring-age 
population has peaked (Das and N’Diaye 
2013: 37).  Due to this demographic 
change, it is probable, from now on, that 
there may be new legislations to 
encourage further domestic investment 
to create a more skilled workforce, 
increase welfare provisions, and initiate 
social policies to increase female 
participation, especially in the migrant 
labour category.  An increasing number 
of migrant female labourers have been 
returning to their rural communities that 
provide non-wage income, and forms of 
family welfare support, which are 
unavailable to them in their urban work 
environments (Li et al. 2013: 20-21).  
Importing labour [from neighbouring 
countries with available labour supply], 
capital investment for technology 
upgrade and mechanisation, and 
delaying the retirement age are all 
possible scenarios that might be able to 
deal with the demographic change in the 
Chinese labour market (KPMG 2013: 5).   
The labour shortage is not a simple 
problem of insufficient supply of people 
with basic or average skills.  As it stands, 
the Chinese labour market is also 
developing a shortage of technicians, 
which can only be alleviated by more 
investment in education, and the 
training of people with technical skills 
(Mao 2012: 145).  Relying heavily on 
labour migration from other countries 
would not necessarily increase the value 
of the skill base of the industrial sector, 
as has been the experience of other 
nations of the world that relied on 
similar labour market measures at times 
of long-term economic expansion. 
 
2. Legislation and Wage Levels 
The Chinese labour market’s legislative 
setting has been subject to continuous 
improvement.  In 2007, the 1994 Labor 
Law was amended three-fold with the 
Labor Contract Law, the Law on 
Mediation and Arbitration of Labor 
Disputes, and the Labor Promotion Law 
[these legislation titles are often 
translated differently in other sources] 
that all came into effect in 2008, which 
tightened the scope of standard labour 
contract, regulated work conditions, but 
also increased employer flexibility, 
whereby female labourers, youth and 
migrant labourers continued to form the 
low-wage, non-permanent segment of 
the labour market (Allard and Garot 
2010: 535).  The Labor Contract Law 
did, however, somewhat alleviate the 
condition of migrant workers as it 
obligated employers to provide written 
labour contracts to all their employees, 
with penalties for employers that do not 
comply, and the new provisions to the 
law which was introduced in 2012, 
reduced the scope for employers’ 
noncompliance (Cheng et al. 2013: 14-
15).  By 2011, migrant workers formed 
44 per cent (159 million) of the total 
urban employment (Qi 2014: 9).  
Another estimate states the number to 
be 262 million [as of the end of 2012] 
(FIDH 2013: 11).  There are variations in 
wages and conditions across the labour 
market (see the discussions in Meng 
2012: 90-91).  This is the case with 
other nations that experienced rapid 
industrialization, and may be possibly 
addressed, in the long run, with further 
economic growth, and coherent 
increased domestic investment in skills, 
upgrading of infrastructure, and 
technological innovation.  Wages and 
productivity levels have been increasing 
continuously in China, and the former 
have increased at a greater rate than 
the latter, but the Chinese labour costs 
still remain competitive in contrast to 
other emerging economies (Ceglowski 
and Golub 2012: 17-18).  The Chinese 
state has consistently placed emphasis 
on maintaining harmonious labour 
relations (Zhu et al. 2012: 120).  The 
state in China has also been focusing on 
increasing domestic consumption levels, 
which are reliant on a steady increase in 
wages [which, in turn, increases 
domestic consumption, and expands 
domestic savings rate] instead of 
primarily continuing with the post-1978 
economic model of low-cost labour-
based exports (see Friedman and Lee 
2010: 530).  The rise in labour costs, in 
most part due to labour demands for 
wage increases, will not decrease 
investment in China due to the present 
skill levels of its workforce, centralized 
industrial policies, and the existing 
business networks (Silver and Zhang 
2009: 184-185).  As per Lisha et al. 
(2014), there are five main ownership 
structures in China, state-owned-
enterprises, foreign-invested-enterprises, 
collective-owned-enterprises, privately-
owned [domestic] enterprises, and the 
others, though all structures display 
similar profiles in terms of wage levels 
(and wage growth rates), social 
insurance provisions, welfare provisions, 
and job training provisions (2014: 177).  
The long decades of continuous growth 
and the increasing bargaining power of 
labour [in proportion to the decrease in 
its supply] may have been the main 
factors in this.  In fact, in 2008-2012, 
the nominal wage level has grown faster 
than nominal GDP (Qi 2014: 8).  
 
3. Unions 
Chinese trade unions form a part of the 
governance system in the country 
(Warner and Zhu 2008: 6).  All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
established in 1923, remains the sole 
trade union organisation in China, 
federating all workplace-based unions 
across the country.  As per the World 
Development Indicators, the Chinese 
labour market consists of over 787 
million people, which is approximately 
double the size of the Indian labour 
market (see the official figures quoted in 
World Bank 2014).  The ACFTU claims a 
membership of 213 million labourers 
across the country (Friedman and Lee 
2010: 521).  In the past there were 
periods when the ACFTU was inactive, 
and no congresses were held between 
1957 and 1978 (Perry 1995).  China’s 
Trade Union Law, which covers the role, 
and responsibilities, of the ACFTU, was 
adopted in 1950, and amended in 1992, 
and again in 2001 (Gao 2006: 97).  The 
Labour Law in China is modified also by 
court interpretation.  For example, The 
People’s Supreme Court issued a fourth 
Interpretation the Labour Law (‘Judicial 
Interpretation on Applicable Laws in 
terms of Trial and on Labour Disputes 
Cases’), which came into force in 2013.  
Since the 1990s, trade unions have 
increased their membership numbers 
spectacularly in the private sector 
companies; and their role has remained 
significant (see Warner and Zhu 2008: 2, 
9, 23).  Under the laws that came into 
effect in 2008, the government has 
provided the ACFTU with more self-
direction at the level of relations with 
employers.  The ACFTU covers the 
workforces of over 200 million 
enterprises, including most of the 
Fortune 500 multinational enterprises 
that operate in China (FIDH 2013: 14).  
In most emerging economies, there is a 
frequent expectation that the labour will 
somehow assume most of the 
responsibility for maintaining industrial 
harmony.  Following the 2001 
ratification of the Trade Union Law 
amendment, the Chinese unions had 
more clearly defined tasks to represent 
their members, and gained the authority 
to sign collective agreements on behalf 
of membership (Heuer 2005: 3).  In 
China companies are not under legal 
obligation to establish labour unions at 
workplace, but employees have the right 
to unionise, and seek collective 
bargaining.  It is not uncommon for 
company management to appoint the 
workers’ representatives once a union is 
set up at workplace (FIDH 2013: 5, 6).  
Under the law, local courts have 
arbitration committees for industrial 
dispute resolution, but they also can 
instruct one or both of the parties to 
settle out of court, as was the case with 
the 2014 dispute between the laid off 
workers, and a foreign department store 
chain which has the third largest market 
share in China (Qi and Burkitt 2014).  
The future of union movement in China 
is continuously debated.  It is possible 
that rather than developing into 
industry-wide, and occupation-based 
labour organisation status, the Chinese 
trade union structure may eventually 
evolve into a corporate model, the 
variations of which exist elsewhere in 
Asia (such as ‘company unions’) (see 
Heuer 2005: 26).  Such a model could 
develop into a new system of industrial 
relations governance; however, this is a 
point about which it is difficult to 
conjecture presently, and will have to be 
the topic of another paper. 
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